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Business Associations
By Robert Park Bryant*

This survey article deals with recent Georgia cases and statutory developments in the areas of partnerships, corporations, and securities
regulation.
I.

A.

PARTNERSHIPS

Existence of a Partnership

Jackson v. Jackson' involved a business operated by two brothers.
Plaintiff, N. Jackson, contended that he and his brother operated the
business as a partnership, although without benefit of a written agreement, and that they had agreed to share the financial results of the business equally. R. Jackson denied that there was a partnership arrangement
and contended that only he had contributed funds toward the operation
of the business. After N. Jackson left the business, R. Jackson continued
its operation for some time but then sold out. N. Jackson sued to obtain a
share of the profits from operations conducted after he left and from the
sale. The jury found that a partnership did exist, but awarded plaintiff
substantially less than half of the sale proceeds and none of the proceeds
from operations conducted after plaintiff left the business. On appeal,
plaintiff apparently contended that if a partnership were found it could
only be on the "fifty-fifty" basis that he had asserted.
First, the court of appeals reaffirmed the principles that in Georgia a
partnership may be formed through either a written or an oral agreement
and that the intention of the parties controls whether the terms of the
partnership agreement vary the characteristics normally inferred from a
partnership arrangement.2 The court then concluded that the jury was
entitled to find both that a partnership existed and that the arrangement
* Yale (B.A., 1971); Vanderbilt (J.D. 1978). Member of the State Bar of Georgia.
1.
2.

150 Ga. App. 87, 256 S.E.2d 631 (1979).
Id. at 88, 256 S.E.2d at 632.
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was not for equal sharing of the partnership's gains and profits.' The primary significance of Jackson may be merely to suggest that conducting a
business jointly without clearly fitting it into some recognized form will
raise the implication that a partnership was intended.
B.

Liability of Partners

In Westwood Place, Ltd. v. Green," the trustees of a trust sued to collect two notes executed to the trust by a limited partnership. The significant issue of partnership law raised by the case concerned the liability on
the notes of one of the partners, who became a limited partner about the
time the notes were signed and became a general partner after the litigation began.5 Plaintiffs asserted that this partner was liable both as a general partner and as a limited partner.'
In determining that the partner was not liable as a general partner, the
court of appeals applied the statute7 that limits the liability of an incoming partner for then-existing partnership debts to those debts that are
expressly assumed for a sufficient consideration.' The court found that
the agreement admitting this partner to the partnership did not contain
the requisite express assumption of liability.' Unfortunately for the defendant partner, the partnership agreement provided that each limited
partner should "'assume the liability for his proportionate share .. .of
any mortgage or like financing on the partnership property assumed by
the partnership . . ."'10 Rejecting defendant's claim that the quoted
provision only established his liability to the partnership, the court held
that the defendant partner was liable on the notes to the extent of his
thirty percent interest in the partnership's profit and loss."
Together with reaffirming the extent of an incoming partner's liability,
Westwood suggests that those drafting partnership agreements can control by careful wording whether anyone other than the partnership may
hold a partner liable on the basis of his required capital contributions.

3.

Id. at 89, 256 S.E.2d at 632.

4.

153 Ga. App. 595, 266 S.E.2d 242 (1980).

5.

Id. at 595, 266 S.E.2d at 243.

6.

Id. at 597, 266 S.E.2d at 244.

7.

GA. CODE ANN. § 75-205 (1979).

8.

153 Ga. App. at 597, 266 S.E.2d at 244.

9.

Id. at 598, 266 S.E.2d at 244.

10.

Id.

11.

Id. at 599, 266 S.E.2d at 245.
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II.

A.

3

CORPORATIONS

Derivative Actions

Two recent decisions considered aspects of shareholder derivative actions. The plaintiffs in C&S Land, Transportation& Development Corp.
v. Yarbrough" initially brought a shareholders' derivative action against
their corporation and certain of its officers and agents alleging waste of
corporate assets. More than two years later, plaintiffs added to their complaint a personal action against certain of the corporate officers and
agents alleging securities law violations in connection with plaintiff's initial investment in the corporation.18 The relevant issues arose from defendants' contentions that, first, by adding a personal claim to a derivative
suit in which they in effect represented the corporation, plaintiffs were
suing themselves 14 and, second, when plaintiffs added the personal claim
to their complaint they had added a new party without the trial court's
consent. 5
In rejecting the first claim, the court of appeals analyzed the nature of
a derivative claim:
As minority stockholders, the cross appellants have a derivative interest in any recovery accruing to the corporation. Thus a recovery by the
corporation from its agents or officers, though directly benefiting the corporation, also ultimately benefits the stockholders. However, this issue
has no effect on whether the corporation through its officers or agents
misrepresented the corporation so as to work an injustice or fraud on its
stockholders in a sale of its certificates of ownership. The recovery or
failure of recovery by the corporation of its assets based upon the malfeasance of its corporate officers and agents is not inextricably related to
and does not terminally infect the right of minority stockholders to sue
the corporation for return of their investment because of the malfeasance
of the same officers and agents, though it might affect the amount of any
eventual recovery."0
In addition, the court concluded that a new party had not been added to
the suit. Rather, "what [was] involved [was] a change in the capacity of
' 7
the parties plaintiff."'
In Hasty v. Randal,8 the court of appeals applied the statutory provi-

sion requiring the plaintiff in a derivative action to "allege with particu12. 153 Ga. App. 644, 266 S.E.2d 508 (1980).
13. Id. at 644, 266 S.E.2d at 509.
14. Id. at 647, 266 S.E.2d at 511.

15. Id. at 648, 266 S.E.2d at 511.
16. Id.
17.
18.

Id. at 649, 266 S.E.2d at 512.
152 Ga. App. 365, 262 S.E.2d 626 (1979).
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larity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure the initiation of such action by
the board of directors . ..or the reasons for not making such effort."'"

Since plaintiff had done neither, his complaint failed to state a claim. The
court left unaddressed the issue of which circumstances excuse a deriva-

tive plaintiff from seeking action from the board of directors.
B.

Access to CorporateBooks and Records

Section 22-613(b) of the Business Corporation Code s* grants to shareholders who meet certain ownership requirements the "right to examine
.. .at any reasonable time or times, for any proper purpose, its [the cor-

poration's) books and records of account, minutes and record of shareholders."'" In Riser v. Genuine Parts Co.," the court of appeals applied

this provision to a demand for access to corporate books and records
made by a shareholder of a large, publicly traded company with over

6,000 shareholders. s Although the corporation had supplied a substantial
quantity of the requested material, it refused access to much of what
plaintiff requested. "

Conceding that the shareholder's stated goal in seeking the disputed
information "to determine whether proper records are being kept, the
performance of management and the condition of the company""s met the
statute's requirement of a "proper purpose," the court of appeals focused
its inquiry on the scope of the term "books and records of account." 6

Although the court appeared to suggest that "work sheets" and income
tax returns would normally not be subject to a shareholder's demand
19.
20.

GA. CODE ANN.
GA. CODE ANN.

§
§

22-615(b) (1977).
22-613(b) (1977).

21. Id.
22. 150 Ga. App. 502, 258 S.E.2d 184 (1979).
23. Id. at 503, 258 S.E.2d at 186.
24. The court summarized the records in dispute as follows:
Refused were profit and loss statements for the past five years of the defendants' 286 company-owned jobbing stores ... ;earnings projections for all divisions and subsidiaries... ; the attorneys' work papers and other files relating to
the investigation of Genuine Parts Co. by the Federal Trade Commission; records
of investments of pension and retirement funds of the defendant, its divisions and
its subsidiaries; all data relating to a merger between Motion Industries and defendant, including the statements and opinions of the attorneys; all corporate tax
returns, all reports submitted to the board of directors of [sic) management by the
auditors .

. ..

and all records relating to aircraft purchase, maintenance, and

flight logo....
Id. at 502-03, 258 S.E.2d at 185-86.
25. Id. at 503, 258 S.E.2d at 186.
26. Id. at 504, 258 S.E.2d at 186. The court concluded at the outset that records of the
manner in which the amounts the corporation contributed to its employee pension plan
were invested should be disclosed.
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under Georgia Code Ann. section 22-613(b),"7 the court in general deferred to the discretion of the trial court for a determination of what corporate books and records must be disclosed. The court suggested that the
following factors would inform the exercise of the trial court's discretion:
Whether the purpose named is a proper one, whether the request is
vexatious or arising from idle curiosity, whether the documents called for
are relevant, material and not over burdensome, whether granting the
requests would violate principles of confidentiality, lead to legal difficulties with federal agencies, or give an unfair advantage to petitioning
stockholders ....28
Moreover, the court approved the conclusion of the trial judge in Riser
that the plaintiff had the burden of showing a proper purpose for each
requested type of information and that the burden should be greater as
"'the information sought becomes increasingly remote from the statutory
objects of "books and records of account, minutes and record of

shareholders."

"..29

Although the court's suggestion of factors to be considered in determining the propriety of a shareholder's demand is well taken, more difficult
issues remain to be resolved. In particular, the court did not consider
whether the statute's requirement of selective disclosure of otherwise
non-public information to certain shareholders can ever be consistent
with the obligations of corporations under the federal securities laws.
C.

Repurchase of Stock by Issuing Corporation

Although Georgia corporations generally have considerable flexibility in
repurchasing their own shares, the Business Corporation Code restricts
their power to do so in several ways, one of the more fundamental of
which is that no purchases may be made "for any purpose at a time when
the corporation is insolvent.""0 The plaintiff in Hullender v. Acts IP11
sought to except from this rule repurchases made by an insolvent corporation when no corporate creditors would be prejudiced.2 Plaintiff, as
part of a divorce settlement, transferred all of her stock in a corporation
owned solely by her and her former husband to the corporation in exchange for a note. Pointing out that it was insolvent at the time it agreed
to repurchase plaintiff's stock, the corporation asserted that under Geor27. Id.
28. Id. at 505, 258 S.E.2d at 187.
29. Id., quoting from the trial court's opinion.
30. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-513(e) (1977).
31. 153 Ga. App. 119, 264 S.E.2d 486 (1980).
32. Id. at 120, 264 S.E.2d at 487.
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gia Code Ann. section 22-513(e)"3 the contract to repurchase was void.
Plaintiff argued that the corporation "should not be permitted to take
advantage of its own insolvency to avoid liability for its obligations where,
as here, no creditor is involved."" The court acknowledged that there existed authority from other jurisdictions supporting plaintiff's argument
but concluded that the statute "contains an absolute prohibition and does
not provide exceptions for its application." 5 Although the court had no
occasion to address the issue, it may be that, had plaintiff obtained from
the corporation in the repurchase agreement a warranty that the corporation was solvent, a cause of action for a breach of that warranty would
have been sustained.
D.

Stock Transfer Restrictions

In a case discussed in last year's survey,"' the supreme court held that a
bylaw containing a stock transfer restriction was invalid because it was
adopted by the corporation's incorporator rather than its directors. That
holding validated a pledge of stock that might otherwise have been prohibited by the transfer restriction. Subsequent to that ruling, the corporation's directors adopted bylaws containing the same transfer restriction,
in an apparent attempt to prevent the pledgee from foreclosing upon and
selling the shares held by it.
Seeking to block enforcement of the pledgee's security interest, the corporation's shareholders, in Bloodworth v. Sandersville Production Credit
Association,3 7 contended first that the pledged stock was issued before
the adoption of the initial bylaws and therefore was void." The court did
not decide directly that such a contention could not be made. Rather, it
held that plaintiffs were estopped to make the argument because if they
prevailed on that basis "the appellant stockholders would not be stockholders and the corporation would have no right to keep the paid-in capital which authorized it to commence business seven years ago."' 9 Second,
responding to plaintiff's contention that the restriction in the newly
adopted bylaws prohibited the pledgee's proposed sale, the court concluded that it need not decide the general question of whether a stock
transfer restriction adopted after stock had been issued could be enforced
against protesting shareholders, since the equities here were clearly in
33. See note 30 supra.
34. 153 Ga. App. at 120, 264 S.E.2d at 487.
35. Id.
36. Avant v. Sandersvile Prod. Credit Ass'n, 243 Ga. 173, 253 S.E.2d 176 (1979). See
Ribstein, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Corporations, 31 MERCER L. REV. 43, 55 (1979).
37. 245 Ga. 40, 262 S.E.2d 804 (1980).
38. Id. at 42, 262 S.E.2d at 805.
39. Id. at 42, 262 S.E.2d at 806.
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favor of the pledgee, who had been prevented from enforcing his security
interest prior to the adoption of the new restrictions only by the plaintiff's litigation.4
E.

Service of Process on Foreign Corporations

Plaintiff in Spiegel, Inc. v. Odum"' conceded that the defendant foreign
corporation did not transact business in Georgia and therefore was not
4
required to qualify to do business in Georgia as a foreign corporation. '
Nonetheless, plaintiff asserted that under Georgia Code Ann. section 221410(b)' 3 service could be perfected on the defendant by service on the
Secretary of State." The court rejected plaintiff's argument, concluding
that the applicable Business Corporation Code section dealt only with
foreign corporations that had qualified to do business or that should have
qualified. 4' Accordingly, service could not be perfected on defendant
through service on the Secretary of State.
F.

Powers of a Liquidating Receiver

Plaintiffs in Nesmith v. J&G Shoes, Inc.46 invoked the provisions of the
Business Corporation Code that grant to the superior courts the power to
liquidate a corporation when, among other reasons, the directors are
deadlocked. 4'7 The court appointed a receiver to liquidate the corporation's assets. The receiver found that certain shareholders had received
overpayments of salary in their capacity as corporate officers and set off
the excess amounts against the distribution made to these shareholders in
the liquidation of the corporation. In rejecting the shareholders' claim
that the setoffs were improper, the court first concluded that "a liquidating receiver directed to marshall and sell the assets of a corporation has
the power to investigate and record the debts owed to the corporation. He
has this power notwithstanding the fact that those debts were incurred
prior to his appointment." 8 Since the salary overpayments constituted a
40. Id. at 43, 262 S.E.2d at 806.
41. 153 Ga. App. 380, 265 S.E.2d 297 (1980).
42. See GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1401 (1977).
43. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1410(b) (1977).
44. 153 Ga. App. at 381, 265 S.E.2d at 299. The statute relied upon provides in relevant
part as follows: "Whenever a foreign corporation doing business or having done business in
this State shall fail to appoint or maintain a registered agent in this State . . .then the
Secretary of State shall be an agent of such corporation upon whom any such process, notice, or demand may be served." GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1410(b) (1977).
45. 153 Ga. App. at 382, 265 S.E.2d at 299.
46. 244 Ga. 244, 260 S.E.2d 3 (1979).
47. Id. at 244, 260 S.E.2d at 4. See GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1317(a)(1)(A) (1977).
48. 244 Ga. at 246, 260 S.E.2d at 5.
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debt owed the corporation, the receiver had the power to proceed to collect it. Second, the court invoked the principle that a debtor cannot insist
that his creditor pursue a particular method of collecting the debt. Since
setoff "is a traditional means of satisfying mutual debts,"' 9 the receiver's
action was appropriate.
III.

A.

SECURITIES REGULATION

Sale of Limited PartnershipInterests

In Hirsch v. Equilateral Associates,"0 the court considered claims by
purchasers of limited partnership interests in a partnership involved in
real estate investment that the interests had been sold without the required registration of the sellers as "dealers" or "salesmen" and without
registration of the limited partnership interests themselves. The court
first concluded that no registration of the individual defendants as "dealers" or "salesmen" was required since the statute excepts from the applicable definitions "any general partner, or executive officer of any general
partner of an issuer or executive officer of an issuer."5 1 Next the court
considered whether the exemption from securities registration provided
by section 9(m) of the Georgia Securities Act" for transactions that are in
effect private placements had been met. Conceding that three of the four
requirements had been satisfied, the court focused on the necessity to
"legend" securities issued in reliance on the section 9(m) exemption."
The court found that the only document involved in the issuance of the
limited partnership interests was the Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership recorded with the superior court and that the certificate
did not "represent" fractional shares of the entity but rather was "an instrument for the formation of a legal entity, defining the rights and limitations of the entity."" Since there was no "certificate" to which a legend
could be affixed, that requirement was meaningless in determining
49.
50.
51.
(1976).
52.
53.

Id.
245 Ga. 373, 264 S.E.2d 885 (1980).
Id. at 376, 264 S.E.2d at 888. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 97-102(a)(5) and 102(a)(15)

GA. CODE ANN. § 97-109(m) (1976).
The statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
(3) any certificate or certificates representing such securities [shall be] marked
for a period of one year from the date of such issuance or sale to indicate clearly
that they were issued or sold in reliance on this exemption and that they cannot
be sold or transferred except in a transaction which is exempt under this Act or
pursuant to an effective registration statement under this Act or in a transaction
which is otherwise in compliance with this Act.
Id. § 97-109(m)(3).
54. 245 Ga. at 377, 264 S.E.2d at 889.
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whether the private placement exemption was available. Consequently,
the sale of the limited partnership interests did not violate the securities
registration provisions of the Georgia Securities Act.55
IV.

LEGISLATION

The 1980 session of the Georgia General Assembly made a substantial
number of changes to the statutes dealing with Georgia corporate law,
some of which are of considerable significance.
Georgia Code Ann. section 22-501(b)(1)" has been amended to add
flexibility to the characteristics that a corporation may confer on shares
of its preferred stock. Prior to the amendment, only the corporate issuer
of preferred stock could compel its redemption." As modified, the section
provides that preferred stock may be made redeemable at the option of
the holder, pursuant to the conditions fixed by the articles of
incorporation.
The legislature added new subsection (k) to Georgia Code Ann. section
22-1314.58 The new section provides an expedited involuntary dissolution
procedure for a corporation that has failed to file any of the annual reports required by Georgia Code Ann. section 22-1502'9 for the years 1969
through 1978. Under the new provision, the Secretary of State need only
publish one notice of involuntary dissolution thirty days prior to the issuance of the certificate of involuntary dissolution and need not mail a copy
of the certificate of involuntary dissolution to the corporation's registered
office or last known address.
Georgia Code Ann. section 22-14170 grants to the Secretary of State
the power to revoke the certificate of authority of a foreign corporation
under certain circumstances. The legislature now has added section 221417.1" to the Business Corporation Code to establish a reinstatement
procedure for a foreign corporation whose certificate of authority has
been so revoked. The certificate of reinstatement may be issued within
five years after the date of the certificate of revocation. The corporation
must correct the cause of the revocation and remit to the Secretary of
State all taxes, penalties, and fees due prior to the revocation and that
would have been due during the period between revocation and
reinstatement.
55.

Id.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.

§
§
§
§

22-501(b)(1) (Supp. 1980).
22-501(b)(1) (1977).
22-1314(k) (Supp. 1980).
22-1502 (1977).

GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1417 (1977).

GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1417.1 (Supp. 1980).
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The legislature amended Georgia Code Ann. section 22-50261 to increase the flexibility available to the board of directors with respect to
series of preferred stock. Section 22-502, prior to its amendment, authorized the board generally to fix the rights and preferences of a series of
preferred stock, if that power had been granted to the board by the
articles of incorporation. 8 The amendment adds flexibility by permitting
the directors, if authorized by the articles of incorporation, both to establish the number of shares issuable in a particular series at the time of the
initial establishment of the series and to increase and decrease the number of shares in the series at their discretion, so long as the number is not
decreased below the number of shares of such series then outstanding.
The more minor amendments to the Business Corporation Code include the following: Georgia Code Ann. section 22-803(c)(6)" now requires an incorporator or his attorney to deliver to the Secretary of State,
at the time the articles of incorporation are filed, the written consent of
the proposed registered agent to serve as registered agent of the corporation. Georgia Code Ann. sections 22-1408(c) 65 and 22-1405(a)(12)" now
require, respectively, that a registered agent of a foreign corporation cannot be appointed without its prior written consent and that the consent
of the registered agent must be filed with the Secretary of State when the
foreign corporation applies for a certificate to transact business in Georgia. The option previously provided by Georgia Code Ann. section 22402 1 whereby a corporation could change its registered office or registered agent by indicating the change on the annual report filed by the
Secretary of State has been eliminated by the legislature.

62.
63.
64.
65.

66.
67.

§ 22-502 (Supp. 1980).
GA. CODE ANN. § 22-502 (1977).
GA. CODE ANN. § 22-803(c)(6) (Supp. 1980).
GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1408(c) (Supp. 1980).
GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1405(a)(12) (Supp. 1980).
GA. CODE ANN. § 22-402 (1977).
GA. CODE ANN.

